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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon an appellate court by the
Appellant1s filing of a timely and sufficient notice of Appeal.
The fundamental and initial inquiry of a court is always to
determine its jurisdictional authority over the subject matter of
the claims. When a court determines that it lacks jurisdiction,
its authority extends no further than to dismiss the action.

See

e.g. Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987).
The threshold issue which must be resolved by this Court is
whether or not the Appellant's failure to identify the specific
Appellees against whom this appeal is brought in the Appellant's
Notice of Appeal, identifying them only as "et al.", deprives the
Court of appellate jurisdiction over claims brought against those
parties who are not specifically identified.

See e.g. Torres v*

Oakland Scavenger Co., 108 S.Ct 2405 (1988)(notice of appeal that
failed to specifically identify one plaintiff was insufficient to
confer jurisdiction on a Court of Appeals).
Although the Torres case involves the failure of a plaintiff
to identify a plaintiff, not a failure to identify all defendants
with specificity, the Defendants allege that the reasoning in the
Torres case also deprives this Court of appellate jurisdiction to
consider Plaintiff's appeal insofar as it concerns the defendants
who were not specifically named in Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal,
but who were only identified under the rubric of "et al."
v

Id. at

page 2409.

See Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure 3 and 4.

Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

See also Graves v. Raypak, Inc., 891 F.2d 254 (10th Cir 1989).
Although the cited cases were based upon the interpretation
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, use of the term "et
al." in the heading of the Appellantfs Notice of Appeal fails to
provide sufficient notice to those referred to as flet al."

That

term is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on courts as to those
not identified with specificity in the notice of appeal.
While this issue is one of first impression for this Court,
it has great significance for this appeal because if this Court
lacks jurisdiction over the other two commissioners, injunctive
relief granted only against Jimmie N. Reidhead alone would not be
effective against the Uintah County Commission.

Also, absence of

jurisdiction over all unnamed Defendants simplifies resolution of
all other issues.

See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 108 S.Ct

2405, 2409 (1988)("et al.," which literally means "and others,"
fails to provide such notice to the opposition or the court).
Therefore, all Defendants below, except Jimmie N. Reidhead,
respectfully request this Court to rule that Plaintifffs failure
to identify the Defendants, except for Jimmie N. Reidhead, beyond
the "et al." designation deprives this Court of jurisdiction of
this appeal as to them, both for issues otherwise properly raised
and for issues not adequate raised before the court below.
vi

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL
1.

Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction over all of

the named Defendants except Jimmie N. Reidhead.
2.

Whether Defendant Uintah County Commissioners were

entitled to the Summary Judgment entered by the District Court as
a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim for personal damages against
the County Commissioners in their individual capacities where the
Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show the existence
of fraud, collusion or bad faith.
3.

Issues that are not adequately raised before the

district court are waived.
STATUTES AND RULES
Statutes
1.

Section 17-5-12, Moneys unlawfully pad —

Recover —

Restraining payment, Utah Code Ann. 1953:
Whenever any board of county commissioners shall
without authority of law order any money paid for
any purpose and such money shall have been actually paid, or whenever any other county officer has
drawn any warrant in own his favor or in favor of
any other person without being authorized thereto
by the board of county commissioners or by law and
the same shall have been paid, the county attorney
of such county shall institute suit in the name of
the county against such person or such officer and
his official bondsman to recover the money so paid,
and when the money has not been paid on such order
or warrants, the county attorney of such county upon
receiving notice thereof shall commence suit in the
name of the county to restrain the payment of the
same; no order of the board of county commissioners
shall be necessary in order to maintain either of
such actions.

vii

2.

Section 17-5-16(3), Books to be kept, Utah Code Ann.

1953 provides:

The board must cause to be kept:

(3) A road book, containing all proceedings and
adjudication relating to the establishment,
maintenance, care and discontinuance of
roads and road districts, and all contracts
and other matters pertaining thereto.
3.

Section 27-12-89, Public use constituting dedication,

Utah Code Ann. 1963, provides:
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
4. Section 27-15-3, Maps to be prepared by county -- Indication of roads, Utah Code Ann. 1978, provides:
(1) Each county shall prepare maps showing to the
best of its ability the roads within its boundaries
which were in existence as of October 21, 1976. Preparation of these maps may be done by the county itself or through any multi-county planning district in
which the county participates. A county shall be given
a minimum of two years to complete mapping of the roads
within its boundaries.
(2) Any road which is established or constructed after
October 21, 1976, shall similarly be reflected on the
maps prepared as provided in Subsection (1).
(3) Upon completion of any map provided for under
either Subsection (1) or Subsection (2) the county
shall provide a copy of it to the Department of
Transportation. This department shall scribe each
road shown on this map on its own county map series
but shall not be responsible for the validity of any
such road nor its being inventoried. The department
shall also keep on file an historical map record of
the road as so provided by the counties.
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5.

Section 52-4-1, Declaration of public policy, Utah Code

Annotated 1977, provides:
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and
declares that the state, its agencies and political
subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the
people's business. It is the intent of the law that
their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.
6.

Section 52-4-2, Definitions, Utah Code Annotated 1987,

provides:
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body,
with a quorum present, whether in person or by means
of electronic equipment, for the purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the public body
has jurisdiction or advisory power. This chapter shall
not apply to chance meetings. "Convening," as used in
this subsection, means the calling of a meeting of a
public body by a person or persons authorized to do so
for the express purpose of discussing or acting upon a
subject over which that public body has jurisdiction.
(2) "Public body" means any administrative, advisory,
executive, or legislative body of the state or its
political subdivisions which consists of two or more
persons that expends, disburses, or is supported in
whole or in part by tax revenue and which is vested
with the authority to make decisions regarding the
publicfs business. "Public body" does not include
any political party, group, or caucus nor any conference committee, rules or sifting committee of the
Legislature.
(3) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the membership
of a public body, unless otherwise defined by applicable law, but a quorum does not include a meeting of
two elected officials by themselves when no action,
either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over
which these elected officials have jurisdiction.

ix

7.

Section 52-4-3, Meetings open to the public —

Except-

ions , Utah Code Annotated 1977, provides:
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed
pursuant to Sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5.
8.

Section 52-4-4, Closed meeting held upon vote of
membership -- Business -- Reasons for meetings
recorded, Utah Code Annotated 1977, provides:
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote
of two-thirds of the members of the public body present
at an open meeting for which notice is given pursuant
to Section 52-4-6; provided a quorum is present. No
closed meeting is allowed except as to matters exempted
under Section 52-4-5; provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall
be approved at a closed meeting. The reason or reasons
for holding a closed meeting and the vote, either for
or against the proposition to hold such a meeting, cast
by each member by name shall be entered on the minutes
of the meeting. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require that any meeting be closed to the
public.

9.

Section 52-4-5, Purposes of closed meetings ~ Chance
meetings and social meetings excluded — Disruption of
meetings, Utah Code Annotated 1977, provides:
(1) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Section
52-4-4 for any of the following purposes:
(a) discussion of the character, professional
competence, or physical or mental health of an
individual;
(b) strategy sessions with respect to collective
bargaining, litigation, or purchase of real property;
(c) discussion regarding deployment of security
personnel or devices; and
(d) investigative proceedings
tions of criminal misconduct.

x

regarding allega-

(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance meeting
or social meeting. No chance meeting or social meeting
shall be used to circumvent this chapter.
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of any
person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the extent
that orderly conduct is seriously compromised.
Section 52-4-6, Public notice of meetings, Utah Code
Annotated 1978, provides:
(1) Any public body which holds regular public meetings
that are scheduled in advance over the course of a year
shall give public notice at least once each year of its
annual meeting schedule as provided in this section.
The public notice shall specify the date, time, and
place of such meetings.
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section, each public body shall give
not less than 24 hours public notice of the agenda,
date, time, and place of its meetings.
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by:
(a) posting written notice at the principal office
of the public body, or if no such office exists,
at the building where the public meeting is to be
held; and
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of
general circulation within the geographic jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media
correspondent.
(4) When because of unforseen circumstances it is
necessary for a public body to hold an emergency
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent
nature, the notice requirements of Section 52-4-6(2)
may be disregarded and the best notice practicable
given. No such emergency meeting of a public body
shall be held unless an attempt has been made to
notify all of its members and a majority votes in
the affirmative to hold the meeting.

xi

Section 52-4-7, Minutes of open meetings — Public meetings — Recording of meetings, Utah Code Annotated 1978:
(1) Written minutes of all open meetings.
minutes shall include:

Such

(a) the date, time, and place of the meeting;
(b) the names of members present and absent;
(c) the substance of all matters proposed, discussed, or decided, and a record, by individual
member, of votes taken;
(d) the names of all citizens who appeared and
the substance in brief of their testimony;
(e) any other information that any member requests be entered into the minutes.
(2) Written meetings shall be kept of all closed
meetings. Such minutes shall include:
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting;
(b) the names of members present and absent;
(c) names of all others present except where
such disclosure would infringe on the confidence necessary to fulfill the original purpose of closing the meeting.
(3) The minutes are public records and shall be available within a reasonable time after the meeting.
(4) All or part of an open meeting may be recorded by
any person in attendance; provided, the recording does
not interfere with the conduct of the meeting.
Section 52-4-8, Suit to avoid final action — Limitation — Exceptions, Utah Code Annotated 1978, provides:
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3
and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be commenced
within 90 days after the action except that with respect to any final action concerning the issuance of
bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness suit
shall be commenced within 30 days after the action.
xii

13.

Section 42-4-9, Enforcement of chapter — Suit to compel compliance, Utah Code Annotated 1977, provides:
(1) The attorney general and county attorneys of the
state shall enforce this chapter.
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter may
commence suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to
compel compliance or enjoin violations of this chapter
or to determine its applicability to discussions or
decisions of a public body. The court may award reasonable attorney fees and court costs to a successful
plaintiff.
Rules

1.

Rule 3(c) and 3(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
3(c) Designation of the parties. The party taking the
appeal shall be known as the appellant and the adverse
party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate
court. In original proceedings in the appellate court,
the party making the original application shall be known
as the petitioner and the other party as the respondent.
3(d) Content of the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from
which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court
to which the appeal is taken.

2.

Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in applicable

part, provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers, interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgement as a matter of law.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was brought by Alvin G. Nash, the Uintah County
Attorney, against the individual members of the Uintah Board of
County Commissioners pursuant to Section 17-5-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to recover funds allegedly spent by the members of
that board without authority of law.

See Plaintiff's Complaint.

The damages for which the County Attorney sought recovery
was alleged to be an amount in excess of $20,000.00 for paving
the road that he described as a "private driveway" leading up to
Commissioner Reidhead's home.

The County Attorney also sought to

enjoin the Defendants from spending any further County moneys on
the road for construction or maintenance.
In response to those allegations, the County Commissioners1
Answer denied that any public monies were spent to pave a private
driveway and that the roadway at issue is a dedicated road under
several legal theories and that the County Attorneyfs stipulation
in a closely related case is also dispositive of this case.
Defendants have taken the position that virtually everyone,
including the purported owner of the road, except Uintah County
Attorney Alvin Nash, have taken the position that the road is a
County road entitled to state road funds.

Even if Commissioner

Reidhead did not realize that he had any ownership rights in the
road when the Commission decided to pave the road, his continued
insistence that the road is a County road during the pendency of
1

this action would constitute a clear acceptance of the previous
designation of the road as a County road (offer to make the road
a County road) sufficient to allow the Court to determine that a
dedication had been made.
This case is unique in its allegation that the cost of the
paving an undedicated road should be recovered from individual
members of county commissions.

The County Attorney's action is

based on a theory that any unauthorized paving of an undedicated
road is illegal, see Complaint at paragraph 6.

Ownership of the

underlying right of way required for the roadway is not disputed
by any purported landowner.

Instead the County Attorney seeks to

recover personal damages against individual members of the county
commission.

While the prayer of the Complaint sought injunctive

relief, that issue was not adequately raised before the Court nor
aggressively pursued by the County Attorney during the proceedings
on the Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion.
The allegations made by the County Attorney, if valid, have
far reaching implications.

At issue is what amount of proof must

be plead by the County Attorney to show that the conduct of the
Board of County Commissioners is unlawful.

Where, as here, proof

of ownership of county roads has not traditionally been through
proof of formal dedication of public roads, actions by a County
Attorney to invalidate decisions by the County Commissioners are
inherently suspect, absent sufficient proof of unlawfulness.
2

When this case was initially brought by the Uintah County
Attorney, the Uintah County Commissioners were not willing to
allow County road crews to continue paving any roads within the
County because almost all County roads are undedicated or are
dedicated through the action of law.
Utah Code Ann. 1963.

See e.g. Section 27-12-89,

The resulting layoffs prompted the Uintah

County Road Crew employees to threaten to file a federal civil
rights action against Uintah County.

The Uintah County Attorney

and the Uintah County Commissioners entered into a stipulation
agreeing to allow Uintah County Road crew employees to work on
any County road except the road disputed in this action without
fear of any additional legal action by the County Attorney.
The outcome of this litigation is critical to the interests
of the County Commission because a high percentage of the roads
that are platted as county roads have not been formally dedicated
and extensive legal research and numerous declaratory actions may
be required if the County Attorneyfs mere allegation that a road
is undedicated is sufficient to require the County Commission to
prove actual dedication in order to avoid a threatened imposition
of personal liability for paving such roads.
Defendant Uintah County Commissioners filed their Motion for
Summary Judgment, requesting the District Court to enter an Order
dismissing Plaintiff's action for failure to state any claim upon
which relief should be granted.

Defendants argued that personal
3

d a m a g e s could not be o b t a i n e d from them or t h e b o n d s m a n w i t h o u t
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faith;

Commissioner

was benefitted by the decision to pave a roadway is not wrong as
long as their action was taken in good faith, without fraud and
without corruption; and granted summary judgment for defendants
as a matter of law.

The Court held that the Commissioners had

acted in good faith and that it was unnecessary to rule on the
question of whether or not the road was dedicated.

Judgement

thereon was entered on June 4, 1990. From that Judgement# the
Plaintiff/Appellant has appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are detailed in the four depositions taken by the
County Attorney and reviewed in depth by the District Court.

The

facts include, but ar not limited to the following:
1.

The road at dispute is part of a roadway that once ran

completely through what is now the Reidhead property in Bennett,
West Uintah County, State of Utah.

Reidhead deposition, page 3;

Bigelow deposition at page 10 to 11; Feltch deposition at page 4.
2.

Jimmie N. Reidhead, a Uintah County Commissioner at the

time the disputed road was paved, owns the property on the east
side of the road.

There's an Indian fort on the West side of the

road and an Indian owns the first quarter mile and Reidhead owns
the rest.
3.

Reidhead deposition at page 4.

The entire roadway was used as a public roadway as early

as 1904 and was later used by Indians to travel back and forth to
the Sundance.

Reidhead Deposition at page 6.
5

4.

riii I :/f I. In: original road hus been abandoned througl i non

use by the public and is now pail, ol the Reidhead propei i y

ihmt

portion is bounded on both sides by old fencing and is covered by
Tin*1 nthor.' r\u] of MM> road is a paved County

weeds and grasses

road that connects and intersects with other County roads,

Tlio

disputed section is between the paved section and the part, that
is no longer a roadway,

fico nonei;a'l 1 y Reidhead deposition.
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: > f*>

lorion LUJ. Summary Judgment

poo** ,

JQ-7-7 T

c: e a r l J t

» * •

See Feltch deposition
* r o a d a s i.'oant\

toad).

iraveled by Gene Nyberg, then Uintah County
- *

Jimmie Reidhead became a Uintah County

Commissioner and was part of a much larger graveling projoci - I>ee
Reidhead depositior
H,

i"he desi.'- .

rage 7; and Feltch deposition at page 26.
- of" the road as Class "B" or County road

was made by previous members of the Uintah County i:oiitiiiisi;.i on on
August 9, 1982.

The current County Commissioners, named in this
6

action, relied upon the plat map of County, or Class B, roads to
determine that the road at issue herein was a County road and was
entitled to be paved with state Class B road monies. See Reidhead
deposition commencing at page 15 and McKee deposition at page 10.
9.

The disputed road gravel section of the road has been

treated as a County road for all purposes for years, including
graveling, snow plowing and placement of county road signs.

See

Reidhead deposition at pages 19 through 23; Bigelow deposition at
pages 14-15; McKee deposition at page 12-13 and 14; Feltch deposition at page 19, and 22-23.
10. The County Commission determines where road funds should
be spent.
11.

Feltch deposition at page 15.

The decision to pave the disputed roadway was made by

the Uintah County Commission at a public road meeting held in
June of 1989.
12.

Reidhead deposition at page 8.

The Uintah County Commissioners were all aware of the

potential political implications of their decision to pave the
roadway leading to the Reidhead home and went to extra effort to
ensure that the decision was justified.

See Bigelow deposition

at pages 5-7, 13 and 19-20.
13.

The Uintah County Road Superintendent, Paul S. Feltch,

estimated that the cost of paving the road would be less that
$20#000.00.

Reidhead deposition at page 9; Feltch deposition

at page 6 (cost estimate for matericils a little over $6,000.00).
7

Rather than making the paving of the roadway a special
project, other road
time period.

paved during the same

See Reidhead deposition ui. ± a-je 19; lUyelow deposi-

tion at pages ? to 8; Feltch deposition
15.

. page 21, 26-27 and * ] ,

Following their ir;* • r-.

membors of the Uintah

County Commission voted unanimously u; :jne 26, 1989 to pave the
roadway lead:! i lg up to the Reidhead house.

Bigelow deposition at

page 13; Feltch deposition at page 4
.1 0

""

disputed road was paved over a four day period i n

late August and edL'Ly UeptumJnM <>l 1 *)H9•

Feltch deposition at

page /
I he Uintah County Attorney, as i he legal advisor to the
board ,:,£ county commissions i,., i:; i.espuii\l tile io provide legal
advice to the Uintah County Commission regarding the requirements
oi the law,, including statutory requirements like the roadbooks
and the Open Meetings Act, but County At, I oi ney AJvin <J. N.ish did
not provide such advice
priui

commissioners about those matters

I i hi/; ILfci• *

Commissioners.

-tioi i against the Uintah County

-:^ Section

Bigelow deposition «^ ^agc *

- ^

/

Utah (lode Aunutatiid 14?> l ,

McKee deposition at page y.

SUMMARY oi- ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's failure to identify the Defendants, pxcepl f r
Defendant Jimmie «
jurisdiction over .--

Reidhead, deprives this Court
Defendants t?i{c*;."|4 |nr Re

i-.-

i appellate
I

uat

is so, any injunction entered against Reidhead alone would not
be effective to control the behavior of the other Commissioners,
The County Attorney had the burden to sufficiently allege
and prove that the County Commissioners acted in bad faith# with
fraud or corruption. The allegations that the road was a private
driveway and that the roadway only led to the Reidhead home were
insufficient to allege bad faith.

The County Attorney failed to

allege either fraud or corruption.

The County Commissioners are

the government body to decide how County moneys should be spent.
The statute providing the County Attorney power to sue the Board
of County Commissioners for any unlawful expenditures places the
burden on the County Attorney to show that the expenditures were
unlawful.

Absent allegations and proof that the Commissioner's

actions occurred in bad faith, with fraud, or with corruption,
the individual Commissioners cannot be held personally liable for
their decisions.
Finally, the County Attorney did not allege any further
facts that were sufficient to show that the actions of County
Commissioners were unlawful or that could support imposition of
a judicial injunction of construction or maintenance of the road.
The Plaintiff failed to adequately raise the issues of injunctive
relief, whether pursuant to Section 17-5-12 or to the Utah Open
Meetings Act, Section 52-4-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1977.
Instead of providing necessary legal advice to the Uintah County
9

Coiiiiulijsj om?i s „ tin-1 Cminly Attorney immediately chose t o t a k e the
adversarial posture in this action that may null have oUherwi.se
become necessary if he had first carried out his duty to advise
Iht: bitatd «i( fmnil i1 i\mm iss i OIKM r» and had reserved the judicial
mechanism afforded by Section 17-5-12, Utah Code Ann. IHVJ,.,
ARGUMENT
POINT I -EXCEPT FOR 11R KKIDHKAl), THJLU COURT HA"/ LACK J URISDICTION
If Plaintiff's failure to identify all ot the Defendants in
the N'cr - '
over t

Appeal deprives the Court of appellate jurisdiction

issues raised by liaintilf uii appeal, ihi.s Cum * :; 1 HM»i11

uphold the decision

.Judge Draney dismissing the Complaint as

a mat tei; of law as tu Deteiiditiit Reidhead for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.

Any injunctive relief,

whether pursuant to Section 17-5-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
or to Sections bl-

»de Annotated 1970, and 42-4-9,

Utah Code Annotated 1977, would be ineffective against a single
fount y CommLss i oner.
POINT II

'

' •

DEFENDANT UINTAH COUNTY COMMISSIONERS WERE ENTITLED TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIM FOR PERSONAL DAMAGES AGAINST INDIVIDUAL COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS WHERE THE COURT HELD THAT PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT FAILED TO ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW
FRAUD, COLLUSION OR BAD FAITH

This case is about wlip determines which roads are pubiio and
therefore entitled to be paved, and iiai i itained at public expense*
T^ie

county Attorney alleges that County Commissioners1 conduct in

authorizing paving of tl :ie i oad lead :i i ig t: o Commi ssi oner Reidhead's
10

residence was unlawful because the road is not dedicated and that
the road is Commissioner Reidheadfs private driveway.
County records and maps and the records of the Utah State
Department of Transportation indicated that the disputed roadway
was a Uintah County road.

The County Commissioners had the right

to rely on those official maps.
The fact that the County prepared and filed a plat map that
showed the disputed road as a Class B County road for the purpose
of obtaining road construction funds, without some evidence that
the owner intended to dedicate., is insufficient to prove a valid
dedication.

Automotive Products Corp. v. Provo City Corp., 502

P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1972).

However, absent bad faith, fraud, or

collusion on the part of the decisionmakers, the designate a road
as a Class "B" or County road is valid against anyone except the
landowner or a bona fide purchaser from the landowner.

The only

person with standing to challenge the validity of the designation
of the road as a Class "B" County road was the owner.

Purported

owner Jimmie N. Reidhead does not dispute the Countyfs ownership.
And if Commissioner Reidhead was aware that roadway was his
property, his pecuniary interest could be found sufficient to
constitute a conflict of interest that would invalidate his vote,
but absent facts sufficient to invalidate the other Commissioners
votes, the remaining Commissioners1 votes would be sufficient to
authorize the paving of a road previously designated as a County
11

roa

s

tiueil

Inferring acceptance of
\

the prior Commission ., designation f^fi

make » uad a county

road) through R e i d h e a d f s assent t o t h e paving.
The Counties ai v pul L t i va 1 subdivisions of t h e state* whoso
creation, powers a n d duties are derived from t h e constiti itioi i and
i

x a w . xu x^» .

to govern

- County as to I

and good order and to carry
those- pnhlxc

function of t h e County Commission
\fare

-

<n various activities and i« i »s ovide

services usually considered to b e the responsibility

of a county government.

Its powers include powers speed fi ca 1 3 y

enunciated b y law a n d powers reasonably and necessarily implied
io I'tiiiy mil tin; in lospnnsibilities.

In connection therewith i t:

acts as t h e legislative body for the Co .

;

duties acts as an executive in administering county a f f a i r s ,

in

order * - dischattjo those i oiiponslbj !l; * '•• '•• an effective manner,
If. must necessarily be allowed reasonable latitude or discretion*
Cottonwood CJ ty Elec. v. Salt Lake ~^. _^, -I Com"rs, 499 P.2d
270 (Utah 1972),
The determination t*~ "
M b

f

constitutes n public purpose is

egislatxve iunction, subject «• review

>t

when abused <A:\-.\ ;-;° "legislative body
matter should J
ci-.Mirnaiui ...;,,
Wagner

•

:, it

e reversed except t
,^::

\ ) * unt- * i •'• v .

instances where such

ifestly arbitrcu
:

-"-ad

12

urts

1IH1

""" (Ut.«v,

*> d incorrect.
- ^) •

In conformity with the basic rule respecting the division
of powers of government, this Court should not interfere with
the actions of the Commission unless it appears that it acted
beyond its authority, or acted in some manner which is clearly
contrary to law, or acted without reason so that its action must
be deemed arbitrary or capricious.

Cottonwood City Electors v.

Salt Lake Co. Bd. of Comfrs, 499 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 1972).
County Commissions are empowered to acquire rights of way
for county roads, see Section 17-5-38, Ut. Code Ann. (as amended
1983); and to help to determine which roads are the Class

lf

B" or

County roads in order to obtain state road construction money,
see Sections 27-12-22 U.C.A. 1967 and 27-12-108.1 U.C.A. 1983.
One method of acquiring such rights of way is by dedication.
A dedication, like any other contract, consists of an offer and
acceptance.

A dedication without acceptance is, in law, merely

an offer to dedicate.

Until acceptance the public acquires no

rights, and is subject to no duties. When a dedication is made
and accepted a public highway is created.

Mason v. State, 656

P.2d 465 (Utah 1982), particularly the concurring opinion by
Justice Howe commencing on page 470 thereof.
Dedication can be evidenced by an explicit offer by a landowner and explicit acceptance by the governmental entity.

See

Section 57-5-4 U.C.A. 1953 (subdivision map/plat operates as a
public dedication to all streets, alleys, and public places).
13

Dedicati oi i may also be implied.

Such an implied dedication

must be based upon the intention of the landowner ,, w

~>o

shown by words, acts, or deeds of the owner which might. < . ~a, r
manifest an intention to dedicate.

Automotive Products Corp. v.

Provo City Corp. , 502 P. 2d 568, 569 (I Jtal: I 1 9 72)

K y, Sect Inn

27-12-89 f U.C.A. 1,96! (highway deemed to have been dedicated and
abandoned in inn use

m b ] ;:i c whei i :I t i s used continual ] y as

a public thoroughfare public use for a period of ten y e a r s ) .

But

implied dedications normally result in a dedication of the i: i ght
of way, subject to the owner f s rever si 02 lar y i 1 iterest ai id r i ght to
use the road in a manner not inconsistent with public use.
Add i L iujial Ly, the other defenses stated in the motion, i.e.
the uncontested public use of the roadway ay a public toad s i m v
1917 and the inherent unfairness of allowing the County Attorney
to si, Lpulat »•» tn i in* pavjiKj and maintenance of all other County
Roads while continuing to maintain this action based upon the
allegations that paving the road was

unlawful because the road

was undedicated, should also pjewiiiil 1J1.11 u 1 i f I Itoiii pi eva 11 ,1 nq
in this action.
The law is d e a r ly established i n the State of Utah that, :1 11
order to prevail ™

cn

^

* claim, -

sufficient facts u; : i« ,

.

Cc >ui ity A t t o r 1 ley in 1st: a 1 1 ege

• - expenditure of funds by Coi inty

Commissione .rs was

- uiie acts of the Commissioners

constituted bad faith, fraud or corruption.
]4

Snydej »>• M m k l n y ,

693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984) and Spruell v. Snyder, 693 P.2d 66 (Utah
1984)(public officials acting within the scope of their official
duties cannot be held personably liable absent an allegation and
proof of bad faith, fraud, or corruption).
Although Plaintiff has alleged that the roadway at issue is
a private driveway, the location of Commissioner Reidhead's home
at the end of the county road is insufficient to constitute bad
faith, fraud, or corruption.

Absent a showing that the other two

Commissioners were aware that the road had not been dedicated, or
that their conduct constituted bad faith, fraud, or corruption,
those Commissioners are entitled to a presumption of honesty and
integrity for their official actions.

Snyder v. Merkley, supra.;

Spruell v. Snyder, supra.; and Withrow v. Larkin, 95 S.Ct. 1456,
1464 (1975).

That presumption entitles these commissioners to

public official immunity for their actions in this matter.
Where, as here, the Complaint fails to plead adequate facts
to justify either damages or injunctive relief, the Court should
uphold the District Courtfs Summary Judgment Order and dismiss
the Plaintiff/Appellantfs appeal.
POINT III

ISSUES INADEQUATELY RAISED BEFORE THE COURT ARE WAIVED

In Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings or put at issue
at the trial may not be raised for the first time on Appeal. The
matter is sufficiently raised if submitted to the trial court and
the trial court has had an opportunity to make findings of fact
15

or 1 aw.

Them U'M m

L-.^UOI

which are neither apparent no. wh. -*

are reasonably ascertainable from the pleading:-.
exhibits wi 1 ,1 not be considered

Even II the inegations

: ;.

Plaintiff f s pleadiiigs are generously inlnrpreted, any allegation
not supported hy a factual showing or by f lie submission of loyal
authoiity io not, presented for decision

Further, the rule that

a legal theory may not be raised x

_s

"stringently applied when the new theory depends on controverted
farnidJ. questions whose* relevance thereto was not iiadei to appear
at trial."

See James v»

Preston, 7 4'»/> )" ;,*l 'U9, 'MM int-'!- A|>f».

1987)(citations omitted).
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final
settlement of controversies, requires thai a party must
present his entire case and his theory or theories for
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter change to some different theory and thus
attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of ] itigation,
Huruiy " t

Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984),

citing Simpson v. General Motors Corp.
P.2d

-<-•

, <*/u

(Utah 1970).
applicable when U A « issue 3

filing of a motion for summary judgment.
P.2d

-

(Utah 1986) (issue not raised

?

raised ! ^ :he
•

r, 731

the pleadings <i*.,1

not addressed Jhy I ho tt'ic1"! ruurL wa.\; not xuied on in the appeal
of that motion for summary judgment).
Neither the Appellant's docketing statement, nor the record,
ttia1. Plaintiff ever pressed the

support the tact or any utt vrvnee
16

issue of injunctive relief past the Complaint's prayer for relief
or for an injunction based on alleged violations of the Utah Open
Meeting Act.

Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 47 (Utah 1981).

Instead of providing necessary legal advice to the County
Commissioners, the County Attorney immediately chose to take the
adversarial posture in this action that may not have otherwise
become necessary if he had first carried out his duty to advise
the board of county commissioners and had reserved the judicial
mechanism afforded by Section 17-5-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
No adequate grounds for either damages or injunctive relief were
stated in Plaintiff's Complaint and none should be granted now.
Where materials presented by the moving party are sufficient
to entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law and the opposing
party fails either to offer counter-affidavits or other materials
that raise a credible issue of fact to show that he has evidence
not then available, the summary judgment may be rendered for the
moving party.

See e.g. Schaer v. State by and through Utah Dept.

of Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983).
CONCLUSION
Summary Judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions,
affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to the
requested judgment as a matter of law. Where, as here, there
is no reasonable probability that the Plaintiff could prevail
17

in this matter, this Court should grant summary judgment. See
Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984).
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, this Court should deny
Appellant's Appeal. The material facts are not in dispute, and
these Defendants were entitled to the judgment on the pleadings
and dismissal granted by the Court in their favor based upon the
grounds discussed herein.
Therefore, the Defendant Appellees respectfully request that
this court dismiss Plaintiff's appeal and affirm the Order of the
Court below pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED this §4h day of November, 1990.
LUND & ASSOCIATES

J.

Lui

A t t ^ n e y f|c
Defendants/Appellees

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certifjhthat I caused to be mailed, first-class postageprepaid, ^SS8£ true and correct photocopies of the foregoing
APPELLEES' BRIEF to Alvin G. Nash, Uintah County Attorney,
Attorney for the Plaintiff/Appellant, 152 East 100 North,
Vernal, Utah 84078.
DATED this -5%h day of November 1990.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OK UIN'J'AH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OK UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,

vs.

)
)
)
)

R EPORTER f S TRANSCR J PT
OF COURT'S RULING

)

civiJ, N O . 8qcv-au7u

)
)
)

JIMMIEN. REIDHEAD, ETAL,,
DEFENDANTS.

)

CERTIFIED COPY

)
)

BE JT REMEMBERED, THAT ON APRIL

IJ, ly^U, THE

ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE COURTROOM
OF THE UINTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE, VERNAL, UTAH; SAID CAUSE
BEING HEARD BY 'I'HE HONORABLE DENNIS L. DRANEY, JUDGE IN
THE EIGHTH JUDICJAL DISTRJCT, STATE OF UTAH
* * *
A H £ E A R A N C E S
FOR 'I'HE STATE:

ALV I N G. NASH, ESQ.
UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
152 EAST JLUU NORTH
VERNAL, UTAH 84u7«

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

LYNN J. LUND, ESQ. AND
DAVID S. STEED, ESQ.
UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TRUST
230 SOUTH 5UU EAST, tf2IU
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84 IU2

P R O C E E D T N G S

* * *

THE COURT:

THANK YOU.

THE COURT:

THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS:

THE QUESTION

FIRST

HEFORE THE COURT IS NOT WHAT -- WHETHER

THIS ROAD IS DEDICATED.

IT IS NOT WHAT OTHER

THINK ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE ROAD.

PEOPLE

THE OUESTLON

THE COURT IS WHETHER THE COMMISSIONERS ACTED

BEFORE

IN GOOD

FAITH, AND WE GET TO THAT POINT ONLY BY A TORTURED
EXTENSTON OF LANGUAGE OF THE COMPLAINT.
ALLEGATION AS TO FRAUD OR CORRUPTION.

THERE

IS NO

AT BEST WE HAVE

THE LANGUAGE PREVIOUSLY CTTED BY THE COURT "AND NOT
PERFORMED
COMPLAINT.

IN GOOD FAITH" FROM PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE
THE COURT FINDS THAT THAT IS

PI.HADING TO PLEAD BAD FATTH.

INSUFFICIENT

EVEN IF WE BY SOME

ARGUMENT CLAIMED THAT THAT WAS DECTDED, THAT THAT WAS
SUFFJCTENT TO ALLEGE BAD FAITH, THERE JS NOTHING

BEFORE

THE (OURT UPON WHTCH THE COURT BELIEVES AS A TRLER OF
FACT COULD FIND BAD FATTH ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSIONERS.

THERE IS NO EVTDENCE BY AFFIDAVIT OR

DEPOSITION

THAT THE COMM\SS I ONERS DID NOT DO WHAT THEY SAID THEY
DTD PR TOR TO THE DECISION BETNG MADE UNDER WHICH THIS
ACTION WAS TAKEN.

THE PLAINTIFF HAS FILED TWO AFFIDAVITS
1.

ABOUT

INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS REGARDING THE STATUS OF THAT ROAD.
THE COURT FINDS THAT THOSE AFFIDAVITS HAVE NO BEARING ON

4

THE

5

THOUGHT OR ANY OTHER

6

MAKES THAT A PUBLIC ROAD OR NOT HAS NO BEARING JN THE

7

MATTER

ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT, BECAUSE WHAT THOSE

PEOPLE EXPRESSED AS TO WHETHER

THAT

BEFORE THE COURT.

8
9

PEOPLE

THE COURT HAS EXTENDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AN
EXTRAORDINARY

AMOUNT OF TIME UNDER WHJCH TO PURSUE HIS

\i)

CONCERNS ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION

II

THIS CASE.

12

TO THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR A MORE

1.1

HEARING WHEN THE PLAINTIFF SAID THAT IT'WAS NECESSARY TO

U

HAVE EXTENSIVE DISCOVERY

15

SUBSTJANTJATE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT.

16

CAUSES ME GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE

17

COMPLAINT WAS BROUGHT SH THE FIRST PLACE.

18

THE COURT WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED IN

IN

RESPONSE

EXPEDITED

TN ORDER FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO
THAT

THE COURT FURTHER RULES THAT WHETHER OR NOT MR

19

REIUHEAD OR ANY OTHER COMMISSIONER

W

ACTION

n

OFFICIALS ARE NOT PROHIBITED FROM DOING THINGS

IS NOT THE POINT.

ACCRUE TO THEIR

BENEFIT.

WAS BENEFITED BY THE

COMMISSIONERS AND OTHER

PUBLIC

WHICH

THE LAW REQUIRES WHEN THEY

K i

THOSE THLNGS THEY DO THEM

M

WITHOUT FRAUD OR WITHOUT CORRUPTION.

J5

1U ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF LAW.

IN GOOD FAITH.

DO

THEY DO THEM

THAT THEY DO THEM

I

MR. BIOELOW'S DEPOSITION WHKN UK WAS ASKKI) WAS

?

THKRK ANYTHING DTFFERENT ABOUT THIS ROAD MR.

\

SAID, "YES, THKRK WAS.

4

WHKKK

HTGFLOW

BECAUSE WK HAVK NKVKR

HA!) A ROAD

I WAS AS CAUTTOUS AND AS CARFFUL ABOUT MAKING

THAT THIS WAS A PUBLIC ROAD."

AND THAT DEPOSITION

SURK
IS

6

CI.WAR THAT EXTENSIVE EFFORTS WF.RF MADK TO SKK TO IT THAT

7

IN FACT
IT WAS.

I~T WAS A PUBLIC ROAD OR THAT THKY BKLIKVKD
AMD THK QUESTION OMCK AGAIN

THAT

IS NOT WHKTHKR

WAS A PUBLTC ROAD, BUT WHETHER THKSE

JT

COMM[SSTONERS

10

BKLIKVKD AT THK TIME THK DECISION WAS MADK THAT IT WAS A

I 1

PUBLIC ROAD.

I ?.

GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT WAS MADE BY THE COMMISSION

IJ

WHOLE AND BY MR. BIGELOW PARTICULARLY TO SEE TO IT THAT

I A

HK WAS WKLL FOUNDED IN THE DECISION THAT HE MADE.

1 'S

COURT'S MIND THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT UPON

Ifi

WHICH THK PRAYKR OF THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFF

17

BE GRANTED.

AND THK COURT NOTES WITH PLEASURE THAT A
AS A

IN THE

COULD

ADDTT1ONALLY THE COURT FINDS THAT THE

I H
IS

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,

?.U

THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, THE

^1

COMPLAI NT IS DISMISSED.
THK COURT WILL RECEIVE SUCH

FURTHER

INFORMATION, MR. LUND, AS YOU BELIEVE BY EVIDENCE OR
JA

PLEADINGS WILL BEAR UPON THE QUESTION THAT YOU
RAISED

IN WHICH YOU HAVE REOUESTEU

COMPUTER

ASSISTED

HAVE

SANCTIONS AGALNST THE

TRANSCRIPT

PLAINTIFF.

THR RULRS —

THK BURDEN UNURR RULE

II IS

SUBSTANT I Alif AS YOU KNOW, AMU THR COURT VII J.I. RECKLVR
SUCH OTHKR ARGUMRNT OR RV3DRNCE ON THAT POINT AS YOU MAY
DRRM APPROPRIATR.

AMD, OF COURSR, THR P I.A INT1FF CAN

RRSPONI).
MR. J.UNI):

THANK YOU, YOUR

THR COURT:

HONOR.

I'M. ASK MR. LUND THAT YOU

SUCH FINAL UOCUMRNTS AS ARR MRCRSSARY

PRRPARR

FOP, I) I SPOS ITI ON

OF THIS CASK BASRI) ON MY RULING TODAY.
MR. I.UMI):

WK WILL DO THAT, YOUR

THR COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

HONOR.

ANY OTHER MATTRRS TO

COMK BRFORR THR COURT ON THIS CASE?

IF NOT WR WILL BR

IN RRCRSS.
(WHRRRUPON THR RULING OF THR COURT WAS
CONCLUURU. )

* * *

REPORTER'S CERTJ FICATE

T, MJLO N. HARMON, RPR, OFFICIAL COURT

REPORTER

[N THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL HI STRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY
CERT I FY THAT THE ABOVE AMD FOREGOLNG PROCEEDINGS WERE BY
ME STENOGRAPH I CAI,I,Y REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND

PLACES

HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME WAS SUBSEQUENTLY BY ME
CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRJTTEN FORM CONSISTING
PAGES y THROUGH

5 ROTH

OF

INCLUSIVE; AND THAT THE SAME

CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE
PROCEEDINGS HAD

IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED

CAUSE.

TO WHICH CERT IFJCAT I ON I HEREBY SET MY HAND
TH

MAY,

h V l ) , AT VERNAL, UTAH

sjL6k^-J^-*^^
MTLO N. HARMON, CSR
REGISTERED PROFESSJONAL
(UTAH CSR NO. 5J)
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
AUGUST I , Iy9 J

REPORTER

STIPULATION

This agreement and! stipulation, entered into this 26th day
of October, 1989, among Alvin Nash, Uintah County Attorney,
hereinafter "County Attorney", the Uintah County Commissioners,
hereinafter "Commissioners", and the Uintah County Road Crew
Employees, hereinafter "Employees", is entered into for the
purpose of resolving the conflict that exists among these parties
which has led to the layoff of said employees.

WHEREAS, the County Attorney recently filed a lawsuit against
Commissioners for "illegally" paving an undedicated road
within the County; and,
WHEREAS, a determination was made by the County Recorders Office
that ninety seven (97) percent of the Uintah County
Roads have not been dedicated; and,
WHEREAS, no one to this date has been able to pinpoint the exact
roads within the County that have been dedicated; and,
WHEREAS, the Commissioners were advised by their legal counsel
that the County Employees could not work on any of the
undedicated roads within the County without exposing
themselves and the County to severe liability; and,
WHEREAS, the County Commissioners laid off the said
until this matter could be resolved; and,

employees

WHEREAS, employees hired an attorney to represent them and said
attorney drafted legal papers to file a "class action"
lawsuit against the Commissioners; and,
WHEREAS, said
24,
back
suit
WHEREAS,

papers»gave Commissioners until 5:00 p.m., October
1989 to put said employees back to work with full
pay, seniority, and benefits, or the class action
would be filed; and,

the potential plaintiff employees and their legal
counsel,
the Commissioners and their legal counsel and
the County Attorney all met at a closed
session
Commission meeting on October 24, 1989 to resolve this
matter; and,

iiiiv <'

and stipulate

to the

1. All laid off employees will return to work on Friday
27, 1989.

October

NOW THEREFORE, all of the parties
following conditions:

agree

2. Based upon the recommendation of the County Attorney, the
County Commissioners hereby approve and authorize that all
laid off employees will be paid full back pay, seniority, and
benefits for the seven days they have not worked relating to
this matter.
3. No reprisals or retaliation shall be taken by the County
Commissioners or road department supervisors against any
County Road Employee for having been involved in the threat of
the Class Action lawsuit.
4. Based upon the recommendation of the County Attorney, the
County Commissioners hereby approve and authorize that all
County Road Employees may pave, or do any type of maintenance
or road repair work that would fall within the scope and
duties of their regular employment, under the direction of the
County Commissioners, upon any undedicated road within the
County without fear of another lawsuit or any legal or
administrative
action
being taken against them or the
Commissioners by the County Attorney, or anyone within or
associated with the County Attorney or his office staff.
5. The present lawsuit, filed by the County Attorney, number
89-CU-207-U, will remain active and move forward to resolution
either by future settlement negotiations or by litigation in
the State Court.
6. County Employees through their counsel, hereby agree that this
istipulation settles any and all disputes with the County and
County Commission arising out of the layoffs that are the
subject of the demand letter filed with the Commission on
October 20,*1989.
SIGNAT

Harry HV Sotivall; Attorney
for 4tfnployees

A/Jimraie N. Reidhead,
Reidhead, C]
Chairman

Qc/„

yd^L

fl. Glen McKee

IM^JL
Lynn J A Lund
for Coloraissi

Lynn J. Lund
Attorney for Defendants
230 South 500 East, #210
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 355-5609
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH COUNTY,

:
Plaintiff,

:

RULING

-vsCivil No. 89 CV 207 U
JIMMY N. REIDHEAD, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

Dennis L. Draney, Judge

This matter came regularly before the Court for hearing in
the courtroom of the Uintah County Courthouse on April 11, 1990
on Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court, having

first read the Motion, the Memoranda supporting and opposing the
Motion and all the other materials submitted by the parties, and
having heard argument by counsel and being fully advised in the
premises, makes the following Ruling:
RULING
This is a civil action brought by the Uintah County Attorney
against the individual members of the Uintah County Commission in
their personal capacities pursuant to Section 17-5-12, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. The action seeks the recovery of money and labor
alleged to have been expended to pave a road because one of the
Commissioners and his family are the only persons living on the
portion of the road that was paved.

The issue to be decided by this Court is whether the Uintah
County Commissioners acted in good faith, not whether the road is
dedicated or what other people may think about the road's status.
The Complaint contains no allegation of fraud or corruption.

The

Court finds that, without more, the Complaint's language "and not
performed in good faith," at paragraph 9 thereof, is insufficient
to plead the requisite bad faith.
Whether or not Mr. Reidhead,'or any other Commissioner, was
benefited is not at issue because commissioners and other public
officials are not prohibited from doing things which accrue to
their benefit.

The law requires that when public officials act,

they must act in good faith, without fraud or corruption, and in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
Mr. Bigelow's deposition states that extensive efforts were
made to ensure that the road being paving was a public road and
that the County Commission believed that it was. The issue here
is not whether the road was actually a public road, but whether
these Commissioners believed that it was. A great deal of effort
was made by the County Commission as a whole, and by Mr. Bigelow
in particular, to see that the decision was well founded.
Even if the allegations of the Complaint were sufficient to
allege bad faith, nothing before the Court would justify a trier
of fact could find bad faith on the part of the Commissioners.
There is no evidence by affidavit or deposition that the Uintah
2

County Commissioners did not do what they said they did prior to
deciding to pave the road.

The Court finds that the affidavits

filed by the Plaintiff about individual opinions regarding the
status of the road have no bearing on the issue before the Court.
The Court has extended an extraordinary amount of time for
the Plaintiff to pursue his concerns regarding the actions of the
County Commission in this matter.

The Court is deeply concerned

about the basis upon which the Complaint was brought in the first
place and that the Plaintiff thought it necessary to do extensive
discovery to substantiate the allegations of the Complaint.
The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material
fact upon which the prayer of the Plaintiff's Complaint could be
granted.

Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Counsel for Defendants shall prepare an appropriate order
reflecting this ruling.
Dated this

day of

, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Dennis L. Draney
District Court Judge
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Lynn J. Lund
Attorney for Defendants
230 South 500 East, #210
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 355-5609
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH COUNTY,

:
Plaintiff,

:

ORDER

-vsCivil No. 89 CV 207 U
JIMMY N. REIDHEAD, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

Dennis L. Draney, uudge

This matter came regularly before the Court for hearing in
the courtroom of the Uintah County Courthouse on April 11, 1990
on Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court, having

first read the Motion, the Memoranda supporting and opposing the
Motion and all the other materials submitted by the parties, and
having heard argument by counsel and being fully advised in the
premises, makes the following Order;:
ORDER
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and this
action is dismissed with prejudice against all named Defendants.
Dated this

day of

, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Dennis L. Draney
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that the foregoing RULING and ORDER were drafted
the day following receipt of a certified copy of the Reporter's
transcript of the Court's Ruling and I caused a true and correct
photocopy of the Ruling and Order to Plaintiff's Counsel listed
below, for his approval and signature, on this 30th day of May,
1990.
Alvin G. Nash, Esq.
Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah
84078
Lynn J. Lund
Attorney for Defendants
Approved as to form:

Alvin G. Nash
Attorney for Plaintiff

ALVIN G. NASH #2364
Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 781-0770
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH COUNTY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT

vs.
JIMMIE N. REIDHEAD, et al.,

CASE NO. 8908000207

Defendants and Respondents.
Notice is hereby
named, hereby appeals

given that Uintah County,

Plaintiff above

to the Supreme Court of the

from the Summary Judgment entered in this action on

State of Utah
the 14th day

of June, 1990.

.Hi- day of J u l y , 1 9 9 0 .

DATED t h i s 5~

(ALVrN'G." NASH'
TJintah County A t t o r n e y

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby

certify

prepaid, or hand

that

delivered, a

I

caused

to

copy of the

be

mailed,

postage

foregoing Order

to:

Lynn J. Lund, Attorney for Defendants and Respondents, Utah Local
Governments Trust, 230 South 500 East, #210, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102.
DATED this £^~

day of July, 1990.

1

Ctultfl GSUJ^
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114

September 13, 1990
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Lynn J. Lund, Esq.
Utah Local Governments Trust
230 South 500 East, #210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Uintah County,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Jimmie N. Reidhead, et al.,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. 900335

Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court, this case
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to
that Court. The address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

